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REDISCOVERING HESCHEL:
THEOCENTRISM, SECULARISM, AND
POROUS THINKING
Robert A. Erlewine
‘‘[F]ailure to sense the profound tension of philosophical and religious categories has been the
cause of much confusion.’’ Abraham Joshua Heschel1
While Abraham Joshua Heschel remains a celebrated figure in modern Judaism, one cannot help but
notice beneath the veneer of approbation is a consistent lack of appreciation for his thought. In this essay,
I argue that Heschel’s rigor and ingenuity has been largely overlooked because interpreters apply
categories to his thought which are not only heterogeneous to it, but also whose foundation Heschel’s
thought actively tries to subvert. Rather than elucidating a particular dimension of Heschel’s thought
which I then critique—an endeavor I believe that scholars have been too eager to undertake—I attempt to
clear away some of the ground of past Heschel scholarship which I believe has obscured his work more
than elucidated it. In short, this piece is more exegetical than critical. Of course critical assessment is
important, but before we can critique it is essential that we properly grasp our subject matter.
I argue that certain basic assumptions about the nature of what it means to philosophize about religion
have obscured or obstructed access to Heschel’s work. Heschel’s thought proceeds from a standpoint
which is not only foreign to the sensibilities of modernity, namely skepticism and detachment, but he also
actively seeks to convert them into awe and wonder. However, Heschel’s critics, as I will show, are
unwilling or unable to accept the terms in which Heschel presents his thought, and instead apply
categories that are not only heterogeneous to his thought but also and more pointedly, antithetical
to it. To begin to correct this situation, I will offer an account of Heschel’s theocentric philososphical
theology in order to demonstrate a prominent strategy in Heschel interpretation, namely, viewing his
thought as evidence of religiously committed thinking as opposed to disinterested philosophical thought.
Next, drawing upon Charles Taylor’s A Secular Age, I uncover the assumptions underlying this traditional
reading of Heschel as well as offer a new lens for viewing the philosophical and theological task that
Heschel sets for himself. Finally, I will conclude by considering a few related objections which
I believe are instructive and illustrative of the disconnect between Heschel’s endeavor and the criticisms
of it. This essay is not an attempt to assess the accuracy or validity of Heschel’s position or to diagnose
potential problems that may face it. Rather, it is an attempt to find the coherence of the work itself, which
I argue, scholarship on Heschel has distorted but that contemporary scholarship regarding secularism
helps clarify. Indeed, Taylor’s work helps illuminate the problematic nature of much of the criticism
leveled at Heschel’s work over the years, offering us a chance to view his work in afresh and less
distorted manner.

PART I: HESCHEL AND HIS CRITICS
While Heschel’s most important and influential books were written for popular audiences rather than
academics, it would be a mistake to overlook their methodological sophistication. Heschel begins God in
Search of Man by blaming religion for its own ‘‘eclipse’’ in modernity rather than blaming ‘‘science [or] .
. . anti-religious philosophy.’’ He writes, ‘‘[r]eligion declined not because it was refuted, but because it
became irrelevant, dull, oppressive, insipid.’’ It has become more of an ‘‘heirloom . . . than a living
fountain.’’2 While Heschel is an incisive critic of the state of religion—particularly Judaism—in the US,
his statement should not be read as a critique but rather viewed in terms of its methodological
3
significance. Heschel is establishing the autonomy of ‘religion,’ such that it cannot be subject to foreign

categories which might refute or invalidate it; if it is floundering, it must be the source of its own
undoing.4 As autonomous, the category of religion is by no means straightforwardly and easily accessed.
For example, Heschel makes it clear that both fundamentalism, which claims to have all the answers, and
logical positivism, which evades or dissolves all of the questions, are inadequate frameworks for
understanding the complexity of religion. Both stances avoid lived experience and simplify the
complexities and paradoxes inherent in religion. Instead, Heschel formulates his task in terms of what he
calls ‘‘situational thinking,’’ which he contrasts with conceptual thinking, i.e., philosophy. Conceptual
thinking is tied to ‘‘knowledge about the world,’’ whereas situational thinking is such that the thinker
herself, her very existence, is implicated in the process of thought. Where conceptual thinking begins with
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‘‘doubt’’ and fosters ‘‘detachment,’’ situational thinking begins with ‘‘amazement’’ and ‘‘awe.’’ Indeed,
where many scholars and theologians turn to textual sources, some more or less concrete set of objects for
the key to studying and elucidating the meaning of religion, Heschel prefers to explore the consciousness
of the pious person, ‘‘the natural habitat of faith and piety . . . a soul where the divine is within reach of
all thoughts.’’6
To be sure, Heschel thinks that philosophy has an important role ‘‘as a method of clarification,
examination, and validation’’ in the probing of religious thought. However, philosophy is not, or should
not be, an end unto itself. Heschel charges that the role of philosophy has been distorted such that it no
longer serves as a means or method for clarification and validation but rather is seen as ‘‘a source of
ultimate insight.’’7 For Heschel, ‘‘[u]ltimate meaning and ultimate wisdom’’ are not products of
conceptual thinking, ‘‘are not found within the world but in God, and the only way to wisdom is . . .
through our relationship with God. That relationship is awe.’’ Awe is not emotion, as emotion is within
the self, but rather, ‘‘[a]we is itself an act of insight into meaning greater than ourselves.’’8 In awe, as a
mode of being-in-the-world, God’s existence is disclosed.9 However, God’s existence is disclosed as
anterior to one’s self such that the privileged position of the knowing subject is undermined. In awe the
subject recognizes something ontologically more primordial than itself, and upon which its very selfhood
is derivative. Where philosophy, or conceptual thinking, proceeds from the self to the world, in order to
comprehend it, situational thinking allows Heschel to access piety— rooted in awe—as a way of being
that transcends the limits of what one, properly speaking, can know. Thus, if one tries to reduce the
content of the experiences of the pious person to some more foundational category which we can grasp
with our reason, or, if one tries to grasp/reduce religion through textual analysis subject to historical
analysis, then one has fundamentally distorted religion. If philosophy is to clarify distortions rather than
cause them, its role must be limited. Philosophy and religion are fundamentally different modes of
thinking irreducible to one another; Heschel prioritizes the latter.
For Heschel the very orientation of philosophy is problematic when it seeks to comprehend the subject
matter of religion. Philosophy, so Heschel thinks, seeks to establish the existence of God via premises
whose validity we can evaluate. However, such an approach privileges the knowing subject and turns God
into an object that can be known. Rejecting such approaches as wrongheaded, Heschel reframes the
traditional philosophical approach to God such that it is God rather than the knower that is emphasized.
Heschel states, ‘‘‘I believe in God’ does not signify that I accept the fact of His existence. It does not
signify that I come first, then God, as the syntax of the sentence implies. The opposite is true. Because
God exists, I am able to believe.’’10 It is a confusion brought about by language when one thinks that it is
the human knower who affirms a proposition ‘God exists.’ Rather, existentially and experientially, God’s
existence, as disclosed in awe, creates the very conditions for one’s capacity to think or experience God’s
existence. The danger with the statement ‘I believe in God,’ is that it seems to privilege the self, as if it is
up to the self to affirm God’s existence.
Heschel seeks to bring clarity to this confusion that modern modes of thinking about religion, particularly
modern philosophy of religion have created. He does this by elucidating ways in which the pious person

lives-in-the-world. Heschel explains that it is ‘‘[t]he grand premise of religion . . . that man is able to
surpass himself: that man who is part of this world may enter into a relationship with Him who is
greater than the world.’’11 For Heschel, this means the profound de-centering of the human subject, the
self, such that God is not an object to be known, but rather, ‘‘[t]o think of God is not to find Him as an
object in our minds, but to find ourselves in Him.’’12 God is the subject, and human beings are the
objects. However, this does not mean that human beings are necessarily in tune with God as their
ontological foundation. Rather, sensitivity to God must be cultivated. That is, to be genuinely aware of
God, the proper attitude and disposition must be present. As Heschel puts it, ‘‘[t]he act of thinking about
God is affected by one’s awe and arrogance, humility and egotism, sensitivity and callousness.’’13
Religious life teaches us to cultivate sensitivity to God qua measure and center of meaning. ‘‘The task is
not to know the unknown but to be penetrated with it; not to know but to be known to Him, to expose
ourselves to Him rather than Him to us; not to judge and to assert but to listen and to be judged by
Him.’’14 God never becomes an object of knowledge. Religion, then, is not about proper knowledge so
much as a set of sensibilities, a way of being and awareness that is different from knowing in its strict
sense, where an object becomes disclosed to a knower.15 Indeed, one must cultivate the right sensitivity
and attitudes to experience God.
Heschel’s approach to the philosophy of religion has long troubled critics and commentators. They charge
it with circularity. There is no disinterested method of disclosure; to know God one must be conditioned
with sensibilities that render one sensitive to God’s presence. One must grant the validity of religious
experience if one is to be capable of grasping that the experiences are indeed religious. Even more
troubling for critics is his shift from these experiences to God’s existence and God’s absolute ethical
demands, from thinking about God to being thought by God. This move strikes many critics as too
quick, and as methodologically unsound.
Much can be gleaned about the critical reception of Heschel’s thought, and the resistance to his
methodology, by exploring Emil Fackenheim’s seminal reviews of two of Heschel’s major works, Man is
Not Alone, and God in Search of Man.16 While distinct in tone, both reviews show appreciation for
Heschel’s voice in a time of relative spiritual sterility in Jewish thought but also raise concerns about
Heschel’s methodology. In his review of Man is Not Alone, Fackenheim charges that this book is ‘‘either
too dogmatic or not dogmatic enough.’’17 That is, insofar as Heschel finds it necessary to present
arguments he is not relying on the indisputable, i.e. ‘‘dogmatic,’’ nature of theological claims. Rather,
according to Fackenheim, Heschel attempts to ground his arguments in ‘‘a religious truth immediately
perceived.’’18 But if these perceptions are to count as evidence in an argument then one must submit them
to disinterested interrogation, something Heschel never does. Instead, they are means of eliding
disinterested interrogation and argumentation. Thus the chief failing of Man is Not Alone, according to
Fackenheim, is that Heschel fails to sufficiently distinguish between faith and reason. If one wants to
present an argument then one cannot elide the rigorous requirements of careful reasoning; one can argue
that faith is valid, a philosophical claim, only in the terms set by philosophy. One cannot presume the
validity of faith.19
Fackenheim’s review of Heschel’s God in Search of Man contains similar concerns about the boundaries
between faith and reason, immediacy of experience and the reflection required of disinterested argument.
However, this review is significantly more positive in tone; Fackenheim is even outraged at many of the
charges being leveled at Heschel by other reviewers.20 Unlike his review of Man is Not Alone, where
Fackenheims devotes his attention to uncovering methodological problems, in this review, Fackenheim
works to solve them. He seeks to come to Heschel’s defense against his critics. Fackenheim’s ‘solution’
to the methodological problems he found in his previous review, and to the critiques being leveled at
Heschel, is to draw a distinction between ‘‘religiously committed thinking’’ and ‘‘uncommitted
philosophical thinking about religion.’’21 Heschel operates, so Fackenheim concludes, from the vantage

point of religiously committed thinking and is not attempting to make arguments for the judgment of
those belonging to the ‘‘uncommitted’’ perspective common to philosophy of religion.
In Fackenheim’s reading, Heschel’s thought reveals an important challenge confronting Jewish thought in
modernity: namely, that there are two distinct criteria that mark legitimacy for modern Jewish thought,
criteria that are not necessarily commensurable. There is the bar of Jewish legitimacy and that of the
modern mind. Fackenheim argues that Heschel’s thought, in contrast to so many of his contemporaries, is
‘‘Jewishly legitimate,’’ but it does not address ‘‘the bar of the modern mind,’’ which requires a different
sort of ‘‘legitimation.’’22 It is precisely this tension between Jewish legitimacy and the legitimacy
required by the conditions of modernity that I argue has been highly influential in subsequent critical
assessments of Heschel’s thought. For this reason I will quote Fackenheim’s account of it at length:
For the modern-minded it must seem that religious thinking, being
already based on a commitment, begs the main question. A mediaeval
Jewish thinker could, without qualms, presuppose in his thinking
 תודה מן השמיםand his membership in the נךית. To the modern
Jewish thinker these cannot be presuppositions, but the main points
in question. And they can be consistently points in question, not to
a thinking already religiously committed, but to a thinking which is
not yet committed; in other words, to detached objective (rather than
religious) thinking. It is non-committed philosophical thinking which
must ask what place and significance religious commitments have in
human life, and why some commitments are legitimate whereas
others are not.23
Fackenheim seeks to resolve the tension between the respective demands of Jewish legitimacy and the
legitimacy demanded by modern philosophy by arguing that Heschel’s work is devotional, work for the
already religiously committed by the religiously committed. For Fackenheim, the demands of modern
philosophizing do not apply to Heschel because he is only addressing one of the two prongs facing
modern Jewish thought. Fackenheim concedes that it may appear to the reader that Heschel’s work is
making philosophical arguments, i.e., addressing the second prong, but when this is the case it ‘‘is almost
certainly a misinterpretation.’’24 While Fackenheim’s specific conclusions have not been universally
accepted, his framing of Heschel’s thought as caught amidst the tension between religiously committed
thinking and uncommitted or detached philosophical thinking has been largely decisive in subsequent
interpretations.
More recently, in his essay ‘‘Epistemological Tensions in Heschel’s Thought,’’ Neil Gillman recalls this
familiar binary when he explains that when he teaches Heschel, he ‘‘can assume two very different
poses.’’25 For Gillman, there is the ‘‘ ‘Seudah Shlishit’ mode’’ where ‘‘Heschel’s words flow through and
around me [and] I abandon my critical faculties, I let myself go, and I emerge spiritually enriched.’’26
Then there is Gillman’s philosophy professor mode where he ‘‘bring[s] to bear the full range of [his]
critical, academic apparatus’’ in order to ‘‘conduct a rigorous philosophical inquiry into the statement, to
extract its meaning, subject it to dispassionate criticism, evaluate its strengths and weakness’’ and other
such scholarly-critical endeavors.27 It is in this latter mode that Gillman goes on to criticize Heschel for
the ‘‘thin and tenuous’’ role of philosophy in his philosophical theology. 28 Gillman thinks Heschel’s
view of theology is that it ‘‘is testimony, one believing Jew’s very personal statement on how he finds
meaning in his own life experience.’’29 For Gillman, Heschel’s work is, as Fackenheim might say,
devotional writing to edify those already devoted. However, unlike Fackenheim, Gillman requires that
Heschel’s religiously committed thinking answer to the claims of modern (noncommitted)

philosophy. He writes: ‘‘What I miss [in Heschel’s work] is the critical distance which any philosopher
must bring to his own claims.’’30 Heschel, Gillman concludes, fails to address the most important
questions facing any philosophy of religion.31
Edward Kaplan rejects this trend of reading Heschel as merely a devotional thinker, as one who eschews
philosophy in service to committed thinking, in his essay ‘‘Heschel as Philosopher.’’32 To be sure,
Kaplan concedes that ‘‘Heschel is not a conventional philosopher.’’33 Through a rather idiosyncratic
analysis of Heschel’s writing style, Kaplan suggests that Heschel employs a strategy that Kaplan terms
‘‘phenomenological writing,’’ a process which ‘‘makes tangible the transcendent, radically ineffable
event (originating, as it does, from God.)’’34 That is, according to Kaplan, Heschel avoids the standard
process of giving reasons and analyzing their adequacy, choosing instead to evoke buried memories of the
experience of revelation in the reader’s consciousness. Thus, Heschel is a devotional writer, and yet
his writing from a place of commitment, makes a disinterested argument. Kaplan makes this explicit at
the beginning of his article when he explains that ‘‘the strength of Heschel’s procedure is also its basic
handicap: the assumption that all human beings have at least once in their lives experienced the
momentous reality of God—and have forgotten it. That ‘fact’ can be proven, he contends, only by
re-experiencing revelation.’’35 According to Kaplan’s reading, Heschel is still presenting an argument,
just an unorthodox one that appeals to some criteria behind or beyond ‘mere’ reason. But at the bottom, if
the assumption that all human beings ‘‘have at least once in their lives experienced the momentous reality
of God’’ is false, then the entire argument is spurious.36

Other scholars step away from the dichotomy between committed and disinterested argumentation, and
identify Heschel’s argument as fundamentally tautological. In this vein, and while not without problems, I
believe Arthur Cohen’s critique of Heschel’s thought as grounded in a tautology is more adequate than
Fackenheim’s, Gillman’s, or Kaplan’s respective accounts. Cohen writes that for Heschel:
God is given with our world: to think of him is already to accept his
life into ours, to apprehend his reality is to place ourselves before
him. This is but to say . . . that the only way to enter the orbit of
faith is to enter it—the only way to apprehend God is to apprehend
him. This seeming tautology—and it is a persistent and aggravating
tautology—underscores the fact that Heschel is essentially disinterested
in argument.37
Cohen highlights something important in his claim that ‘‘Heschel is essentially disinterested in
argument,’’ or perhaps better, Heschel is not interested in argument.38 Regardless, while there is
something to this claim, it is only correct on one level and misses the deeper thrust of Heschel’s work.
This deeper element of Heschel’s thought, I claim, is to challenge the larger framework in which
arguments are able, or are allowed, to take place. That is, Heschel’s theocentric ontology is not the
presentation of a particular argument that can be assessed by the standard rules of philosophical
argumentation—rules, which as Fackenheim points out, presume a detached and agnostic attitude.
Rather, it is a challenge to the very framework which gives meaning and legitimacy to the rules of
philosophical argumentation as such.

PART II. POROUS THINKING
Heschel’s unique philosophical and theological voice stems, at least in part, from his distinctive
upbringing. While Heschel’s primary impact was felt in the United States, and the majority of his works

were written in English, as Arthur Green points out, ‘‘[h]is religious ideas had been largely formed before
he came to America, both in the Warsaw of his youth and the Berlin of 1928 through 1938.’’39 Heschel
was raised immersed in the world of learning of Eastern European Hasidic Judaism destroyed in the
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Holocaust. Indeed, while Heschel studied philosophy and biblical studies in Berlin, his religious
sensibilities were already at odds with those regnant in his new environment. In a fascinating
autobiographical statement about his time as a young man studying in Germany, Heschel explains that to
his professors, who ‘‘spoke of God from the point of view of man,’’ the questions that concerned him
‘‘could not even be phrased in categories of their thinking.’’41 While Heschel’s subsequent attempts to
formulate and explore these ‘‘questions,’’ which by their very nature are recalcitrant to traditional
philosophical categories, and have long been understood in terms of the dichotomy between ‘committed
thought’ and ‘disinterested philosophical argument,’ I argue that Heschel works to undermine this very
distinction.
In recent years there has been very important and provocative scholarship on the nature of secularism
which has provided us with a helpful lens with which to explore Heschel’s work anew. Most recently,
Charles Taylor’s A Secular Age, building on the work of theorists such as Talal Asad and John Milbank,
uncovers the historicity and contingency of the categories of the sort of ‘disinterested’ philosophical
thinking against which Heschel’s thought chafes, and in whose name he is critiqued or analyzed.42 Taylor
challenges the legitimacy of such assumptions as if the neat dichotomy between religiously committed
and disinterested thinking were a distinction that did not already presuppose a certain set of assumptions
such as a particularly modern, western, and therefore secular view of the world. Using Charles Taylor’s A
Secular Age, I hope to reveal and therefore challenge the unspoken assumptions guiding the critiques of
Heschel’s thought. A Secular Age, I argue, will provide a lens through which to see, and a vocabulary
through which to express, the task which Heschel’s thought sets for itself in a new way.
Heschel’s notion of awe and immediacy with the divine and the controversy around it can be helpfully
illuminated by exploring the manner in which Charles Taylor charts transformations in the nature of
subjectivity and the sensibilities of individuals and societies in the modern West. In a particularly
suggestive passage in A Secular Age, Charles Taylor writes:
We have moved from an era in which religious life was more ‘embodied’,
where the presence of the sacred could be enacted in ritual,
or seen, felt, touched, walked towards (in pilgrimage); into one which
is more ‘in the mind’, where the link with God passes more through
our endorsing contested interpretations—for instance, of our political
identity as religiously defined, or of God as the authority and moral
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source underpinning our ethical life.
Taylor offers a non-teleological genealogy of the very structures of modernity, of the unspoken conditions
or pre-ontology that separates us from our ancestors. In this genealogy, Taylor charts the transition from
what he calls the ‘porous self’ to the ‘buffered self.’ In the porous self, ‘‘the inside is no longer just
inside; it is also outside. That is, emotions which are in the very depths of human life exist in a space
which takes us beyond ourselves, which is porous to some outside power, a person-like power.’’44 The
buffered self, however, is self-contained, is distanced and disengaged with everything outside
of it. Or as Taylor puts it, with the buffered self ‘‘the possibility exists of taking a distance from,
disengaging from everything outside the mind.’’ The self is now an individual, it possesses agency apart
from its environment in a way that was unthinkable for the porous self.45 Indeed, gaining mastery over
one’s self and one’s environment are part and parcel of the same movement, at least ontologically.
According to Taylor, now ‘‘[m]y ultimate purposes are those which arise within me, the crucial meanings
of things are those defined in my responses to them.’’46

The buffered self provides the conditions for social and political orders no longer rooted in cosmic
hierarchies to emerge. However, this new order simultaneously ‘‘inhibits or blocks out certain of the
ways in which transcendence has historically impinged on humans, and been present in their lives.’’ As a
result, this new order situates ‘‘the buffered identity in a buffered world.’’47 That is, with this new
sense of self, a new sense of being-in-the-world emerges, one where mysterious and supra-intelligible
powers beyond the mind’s grasp no longer have a place, at least in our experiential world.
The relevance of Taylor’s landscape of modernity for elaborating Heschel’s thought can perhaps be seen
most clearly in Taylor’s rightly-celebrated account of the ‘‘immanent frame.’’ One of the central claims
of A Secular Age is that in the ‘‘in the West, or perhaps Northwest, or otherwise put, the North Atlantic
world’’ there has been a fundamentally unprecedented development,48 what Taylor calls the immanent
frame—where one can speak of the natural world, of existence as such, without any necessary reference
to a beyond.49 Jose Casanova explains Taylor’s work as elucidating ‘‘the structural interlocking
constellation of the cosmic, social, and moral orders that constitute the self-sufficient immanent frame
within which we are constrained to live and experience our lives, secular as well as religious.’’ That is, as
Casanova highlights, ‘‘[a]ll three orders—the cosmic, the social, and the moral—are understood as purely
immanent secular orders, devoid of transcendence esti Deus non daretur.’’ For Taylor, as Casanova
helpfully points out, it is not whether or not one continues to hold religious beliefs that constitutes this
secular age so much as ‘‘this phenomenological experience’’ of one’s life as delimited by the immanent
frame.50
To be sure, in accounting for the immanent frame, Taylor by no means thinks he is simply making a case
for atheism, but rather he is uncovering the fundamental and primordial conditions in which faith and
religiosity might emerge at present in the West, i.e., ‘‘the North Atlantic World.’’51 Taylor explains that
this world, conditioned by the immanent frame, is a ‘‘pluralist world, in which many forms of belief and
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unbelief jostle, and hence fragilize each other.’’ Pluralism is more than simply a diversity of faiths—as
coexistence has a long history—rather it is a condition where coexistence now maximizes the fragilizing
effects of one’s own relationship to one’s own faith-tradition. Belief can no longer be taken for granted.
Taylor suggests that there is no longer any sense of immediacy with religious beliefs. As a result, one
can—and indeed almost inevitably does—ask questions such as ‘‘why my way, and not hers?’’ As
modern social and political forms of life have fostered homogeneity, adherents of different faith traditions
resemble each other more and more, and thus: ‘‘We are more and more like each other. The distances
which keep the issues between us at bay get closer and closer. Mutual fragilization is at its maximum.’’53
If we now return to the discussion of Heschel’s methodology by his critics, it should be clear that their
concerns are by no means absurd. His critics, to borrow Taylor’s terminology, are looking for answers
that beset the buffered self confronted by cross pressures and mutual fragilization, the self for whom
tradition no longer makes a self-evident claim. That is, they seek a philosophical theology that can
address the intellectual upheavals of a fragmented and pluralistic spiritual and religious landscape. As
Fackenheim argues, in the contemporary world, in order to satisfy the conditions of the modern mind, one
must ask ‘‘what place and significance religious commitments have in human life, and why some
commitments are legitimate whereas others are not.’’54 For Fackenheim these are philosophical not
religious questions. While Taylor does not discuss Jews or Judaism, one could argue that the Jewish
community has been particularly beset by cross pressures, and not only on the epistemological level,
i.e., why my religion and not hers? Rather, these very modern questions become more existentially
pressing when coupled by the liminal space that Jews have and continue to occupy socially and politically
as a result of their marginal whiteness, the Holocaust, the challenges of assimilation, and so on.55
If we read Fackenheim’s, Cohen’s, Gillman’s, and Kaplan’s discussions of Heschel with Taylor’s work in
mind, we see that they seek in Heschel’s work something that can speak to a situation where existential

and religious commitments are fragilized, in a world that is at once more homogenous and (mostly)
accepting and yet for these very reasons more threatening for traditional Jewish life than ever. What they
fail to recognize is that Heschel does not offer arguments meant to satisfy the conditions of fragilization
and cross-pressures, where a disinterested and philosophical stance is seen as necessary since faith is
no longer immediate. While Heschel’s critics remain within the immanent frame in their critiques of his
work, Heschel himself seeks to challenge this very structure on an ontological level.
Heschel, caught between, or rooted in, both old-world Hasidism and western modernity, brings a different
sensibility that does not conform or gibe easily with the dominant picture of the secular—religious or
irreligious. If we are again to use Taylor’s terminology, Heschel is one who still has a foot in the porous
self, for whom ‘‘[b]y definition . . . the source of its most powerful and important emotions are outside
the ‘mind.’ ’’56 Taylor’s porous self fits with Heschel’s descriptions of awe which is not within the self so
much as a transformation of the self’s way of being-in-the-world, a shift in the very way the self
encounters God and the world. Heschel wants to break free from the very condition that Taylor traces
with such care and whose dichotomies Fackenheim, Gillman, and Kaplan think are inherent to the modern
condition. Rather than work within the confines dictated by this condition, Heschel attempts to undercut
its assumptions. For Heschel, the porous self is not a primitive, superstitious relic to be overcome, nor is
the buffered self an inevitable, de facto element of the modern world.57 In short, to use Taylor’s language,
Heschel uses the sensibilities of the porous self to challenge the assumptions of (modern) reason, and thus
the buffered self, asking if rather than emancipating the human being from a world of superstition, it has
not instead walled the mind up in a trap such that it is no longer in touch with reality.
Heschel’s sensibilities are at once modern and antimodern. He rejects the buffered self, but he does not
try to retrieve the magical aura of what Taylor calls the ‘‘enchanted world’’ coeval with his (Taylor’s)
account of the porous self.58 Rather, Heschel offers a retrieval of the premodern porous self, a retrieval
that is very much modern in its emphasis on ethical universalism.59 This ethical universalism, however, is
rooted not in anthropocentric but theocentric ontology.
In Heschel’s work there is a preexisting divine order that ought to guide our lives. This order is not to be
discovered through reason, as with the premodern (and indeed, pre-Kantian) rationalists, but rather, this
order has much more to do with the self and its orientation to reality. Without wonder, without a sense of
the wide horizons which dislocate and decenter the knowing subject, there is an inability to truly judge
one’s self, to get beyond one’s own ego-centrism and pretensions, one’s own desire to be deceived about
oneself. Or as Heschel puts it, ‘‘[m]eaning is not man’s gift to reality . . . . The essence of thought is
discovery rather than invention.’’60 Indeed, Heschel problematizes modern philosophical sensibilities
even more radically, stressing the marginal status of human beings in relation to God. ‘‘How monstrous
to think of faith as an act of man’s giving his expert opinion, as an act of acknowledgment, of granting
recognition to God.’’61 For Heschel there is no question that God exists; the danger is that we may be too
spiritually coarse and lacking in refinement to recognize it. Thus it is imperative to cultivate a sense of the
divine, to make oneself more spiritually sensitive to God’s presence. To be sure, there is circularity at
work in Heschel’s thought, but the vantage point from which circularity is an objection is already one
distanced from the sort of immediacy and preexisting order to which Heschel’s thought gives priority.62

The conditions of which Heschel is so critical are tacitly assumed by Heschel’s critics as simply the way
things are. That they should be presumed as simply obvious makes sense when one recognizes that they
are none other than the very sensibilities inherent to Taylor’s immanent frame, and thus ubiquitous to the
modern West. In their ‘‘Editor’s Introduction’’ to Varieties of Secularism in a Secular Age, Michael
Warner, Jonathan Vanantwerpen, and Craig Calhoun point out that Taylor elucidates ‘‘how the
development of a secular age changed both belief and unbelief, both religious and nonreligious

institutions, the way human beings understood themselves and their natures.’’63 In the immanent frame
religion and transcendence have not disappeared but they have gradually transformed. According to
Taylor, the buffered self exists in a ‘‘civilizational framework which inhibits or blocks out certain of the
ways in which transcendence has historically impinged on humans, and been present in their lives. It
tends to complete and entrench on a civilizational level [an] anthropocentric shift.’’64 Religious life is no
longer so much ‘‘embodied’’ as ‘‘more ‘in the mind’, where the link with God passes more through our
endorsing contested interpretations.’’65 Human beings, not God, are the primary agents, and they set the
course for their lives in a world beset by uncertainty and a multitude of conflicting ways of life. Religion
now becomes a matter of praxis and the affirmation or rejection of certain theoretical principles that can
no longer be taken as indubitable. Indeed, the meaning-giving self now has to decide for itself between a
variety alternatives competing for its affiliation. In short, the dominant assumptions about religion held
both by believers and nonbelievers are antagonistic to the sort of religiosity that Heschel thinks
imperative to spiritual well-being. For example, the assiduous observance of halakha can lead to piety but,
given this lack of continuity with the premodern spiritual world, it can, and often does, lead to mere
‘‘religious behaviorism’’ instead.66
Heschel insists that the experience or sense of God cannot be encapsulated by human thinking, cannot be
adequately formulated in creeds or propositions. Western modernity or the secular is problematic for
Heschel insofar as it brings with it the buffered self, where human thinking becomes the center of eaning,
undercutting the sense of the ineffable. Without the ineffable, the experience of God that de-centers and
reorients the self, one is walled up in one’s own mind and alienated from one’s true nature. In sharp
contrast to what Taylor would describe several decades later as the immanent frame, where the cosmos
and moral world exist self-sufficiently without necessary recourse to transcendence, Heschel insists,
‘‘[n]othing exists for its own sake, nothing is valid by its own right . . . All is set in the dimension of the
holy. All is endowed with bearing on God.’’67 Rather than as monads, constructing and construing
meaning for one’s self, Heschel emphasizes the disposition of awe where one realizes ‘‘that life takes
place under wide horizons, horizons that range beyond the span of an individual life or even the life of a
nation, a generation, or an era.’’68 Awe radically reorients one, moving one to view one’s self from what
one takes to be God’s perspective, where one is a mere creature in a world one did not make, an actor in a
drama one did not write. Without this exposure to that which is greater, this de-centering upon encounter
with the one true Subject, human beings, who by their very nature are rooted in ‘‘dishonesty,
egocentricity, and avarice,’’ believe themselves self-sufficient.69 Thus, even if one’s intentions
are good, or perhaps better—even if one thinks one’s intentions are good—unless one finds a way to
beyond oneself to that which is ontologically primordial, to that which is the foundation of justice, one
will always stumble into injustice. This is not an uncontroversial position.
Underneath many of the critiques of Heschel’s thought as insufficiently philosophical lies an unease with
the manner in which Heschel de-centers the human subject. Gillman acknowledges a ‘‘discomfort’’ with
the notion that God’s existence precedes our knowledge of God. Gillman explains that he is
uncomfortable with the ‘‘self-verifying’’ nature of Heschel’s stance, a posture, he charges, which ‘‘has
70
lead to more disasters in the name of religion than we can count.’’ Similarly, in ‘‘The Role of the
Secular in Abraham Joshua Heschel’s Theology: (Re)Reading Heschel After 9/11,’’ Shaul Magid reads
Heschel as a cold-war theologian who, in contrast to Godless communism and fascism, ‘‘believes that
religion and God are the answer to all human travail and that religion should be part of, perhaps even
71
dominate, the public sphere.’’ Magid, considering the distance between Heschel’s time and our own,
turns to figures like Ayatollah Khomenai, suicide bombers, and the Christian Right, and wonders if
our contemporary problem ‘‘may arguably be not the lack of God but too much God.’’72

The worries of both Gillman and Magid, namely that the threat of theocracy and its violence looms in the
thought of Heschel, are predicated upon the dichotomy between religiously committed thinking as
opposed to disinterested, philosophical thinking. It is clear that both Gillman and Magid privilege the
latter form of thinking. Both Gillman and Magid fail to appreciate the ways in which Heschel’s
theocentrism de-centers not only the subject but also theology and theological authority, such that ‘‘all
[creedal] formulations and articulations appear as understatements.’’ Indeed, Heschel insists that through
religious affects such as awe ‘‘our souls are swept away by the awareness of the urgency of answering
God’s commandment, while stripped of pretension and conceit we sense in the tragic insufficiency of
human faith.’’73 Gillman and Magid are not wrong to see Heschel as firmly committed to a theocentric
foundation which is profoundly at odds with dominant modes of secular liberalism, but this theocentrism
is not without resources for accomplishing many of the cognitive/civic virtues that such liberal thinkers as
John Rawls and Ju¨rgen Habermas advocate, with its notion of radical humility that de-centers the subject
and challenges dogmatic assumptions.74 Heschel’s theocentrism hardly promotes a theocracy or religious
violence. All theocentrisms are not the same and should not be treated as such.
I believe that we can find the root of much scholarly resistance to
Heschel if we look in another not entirely unrelated direction.
Fackenheim and Cohen argue that there is a certain lack of sympathy
displayed by Heschel’s piety. Fackenheim charges Heschel with lacking
‘‘understanding for the tragedy of unbelief.’’75 Similarly, in a rather
remarkable footnote, Cohen elegantly explains:
There is a difference between the hearer who hears the Word of God
and disobeys and hearer who hears only the record of the Word of
God and disobeys. The prophetic claim upon Israel in the days of
God’s public revelation is an order of unqualified claim . . . .But today,
twenty centuries or more later, our condition is different. We have
not heard with our own ears. We have heard only through the ears of
history which records and transcribes. We do not trust history: we do
not trust transcriptions. We are closed to revelation—not for having
heard, but for not having heard. The burden of faith is greater upon
us than upon our forefathers, because we must believe without hearing.
This is why . . . we cannot finally accept Heschel’s . . . theology.
Post-Biblical man cannot be shamed into belief. We deserve more
compassion—if we do not deserve it from God, we insist upon it
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from theologians.
What is this ‘‘tragedy of unbelief’’ or this being ‘‘closed to revelation’’ that Fackenheim and Cohen
speak of? Are these commentators not highlighting that modern sensibilities block out, or prevent one
from attributing veridicality to affects such as awe and radical amazement? If they are to operate with
intellectual integrity they must treat awe and wonder as mere affects within the self, not as conduits to
transcending the self. As long as one remains a buffered self, as long as one is rooted firmly in the
immanent frame, Heschel’s thought, as evocative and challenging as it is, remains fundamentally alien,
the force of its claims recalcitrant.
Heschel, a figure who dwelt between Eastern and Western Europe, appeals to sensibilities that his
Western audience finds strange and foreign. Cohen’s footnote testifies in a striking fashion to an inability
to experience the immediacy of awe, to a world closed off to a sense of transcendence that Heschel’s
pious man exemplifies, a sensibility he simply lives. From their buffered perspectives, torn by
commitments to Judaism but lacking the immediacy which Heschel’s work seeks to cultivate in its

readers, it is not so much a lack of rigor but an inability to escape the fragilized, cross pressured nature of
the modern mind which make Heschel’s work so hard to fathom. In Cohen’s words we see a frank
confession of the inability to read Heschel in his own terms. This inability—which is lamented to no
small degree—stems from the conditioning of the immanent frame, its sensibilities and limitations. As
Cohen notes, the ‘‘burden of faith’’ is terribly heavy for the modern Jew who is ‘‘closed to revelation.’’
However, much has changed in the intellectual landscape since the 1950s and 1960s when Fackenheim
and Cohen were writing their commentaries on Heschel. It is by no means clear, indeed it is doubtful
that in the wake of poststructuralism and the so-called ‘‘return to religion,’’ that the assumptions and
sensibilities which formed and structured the horizons of meaning of Fackenheim and Cohen as
well as other early commentators on Heschel, continue unabated for contemporary generations. And yet,
contemporary critics continue to operate with their categories, without investigating whether these
categories remain valid. To be sure, few today possess the sense of piety that Heschel sought to cultivate
in his readers, but many of the formal and structural obstacles that have distorted Heschel’s work can now
be cleared away to allow for a fresh hearing.
Notes
In many ways this article grew forth from a comment Susannah Heschel once made in a conversation
with me. While her thoughtful comments provided the impetus to think about A.J. Heschel’s work in a
new way, this particular argument and whatever errors may inhere in it are entirely my own. I would also
like to thank Molly Robey and Martin Kavka whose insightful suggestions greatly aided the revision
process of this essay.
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